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1 Introduction
A mobile agent is a program that executes autonomously on a set of network
hosts on behalf of an individual or organization. The agent visits the network
hosts to execute parts of its program and may interact with other agents
residing on that host or elsewhere on other hosts, while working toward a goal.
The agent may also remain ﬁxed on any host for an indeﬁnite period. The
sequence of hosts that the agent visits may be either predetermined when an
agent program is written, or determined dynamically at the time it is initiated
or through information it acquires before leaving a host. For example, the
agent may need to access information at a speciﬁc network host, or prefer to
execute parts of its program on various types network hosts oﬀering needed
services.
Mobile agent computing is a radical form of distributed computing, which
poses a signiﬁcant challenge to the security of the agents that form an ap-
plication and of the hosts on which they execute. One diﬃcult class of
threats introduced by mobility is the possibility that the computational en-
vironment (i.e., the host and supporting software) may attempt to subvert
visiting agents. Other threats include agents attacking the computational en-
vironment or other agents visiting the host, and outside entities attacking the
overall agent framework.
A wide range of security techniques, both conventional and newly devel-
oped for this paradigm, are available as technical countermeasures against the
security threats encountered in deploying agent-based applications [1]. Com-
mon countermeasures found in agent systems include the following items:
• Isolation of agents from the computational environment and from one an-
other,
• Language and code safety,
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• Controlled access to and limited consumption of resources,
• Audit by both agents and platforms,
• Authenticated and protected communications,
• Signed code, and
• Partial result encapsulation.
Agent systems typically incorporate such countermeasures into their de-
sign, where internal data structures reﬂect if, how, and when a security mech-
anism is applied. These data structures typically contain authorization infor-
mation or privileges regarding an agent’s capabilities on distributed systems,
and conceptually serve as an internal passport for the agent. While these
structures are often very similar semantically, they diﬀer greatly in their im-
plementation, depending largely on the mechanisms used to protect their con-
tents. In reviewing a number of agent systems, we noted several shortcomings
from using internal data structures to convey policy rules.
• Among applications, the number of policy-setting principals and the trust
relationships that are needed can vary considerably. However, within an
agent system those representations are typically ﬁxed and unchangeable.
This dichotomy forces developers of agent-based applications to conform
to the imposed scheme, which may or may not match well the intended
security policy of their application.
• Policy expression varies among agent systems in terms of granularity, lan-
guage, and resource entities, and is often diﬃcult for an application devel-
oper to modify or extend. When combined with the previous shortcoming,
the overall result is to constrain a developer into a rigid framework that
may require an elaborate work-around to express the intended policy or, at
worst, may be completely inadequate for the needs of the application.
• The means of protecting policy, once expressed and residing in an inter-
nal data structure, also varies among agent systems, particularly regarding
strength of protection. Each agent system must be closely reviewed to de-
cide whether the expressed policy is satisfactorily protected for the risk
environment of the application.
• Because the internal policy-related data structures, trust relationships, pol-
icy expression, and strength of policy protection as a whole diﬀer widely
among agents developed for diﬀerent agent systems, the opportunity for
interoperability of agent systems is severely limited.
To overcome these noted shortcomings, we devised a scheme that allo-
cates, manages, and enforces security policies in a ﬂexible manner, which
allows freedom in determining the granularity, language, and entities of the
policy expression, as well as the relevant policy-setting principals and their
precedence relationships. The remainder of the paper describes this scheme,
beginning with a general overview, followed by some practical considerations
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about its application, and then a more detailed look at its use in Java-based
agent systems, ending with an overview of related work.
2 Scheme Overview
Mobile agent systems have been and continue to be implemented in various
ways. Interpreted scripting languages or virtual machine-based interpretive
language compilers are frequently used for their inherent ﬂexibility in adapting
heterogeneous platforms to support agents uniformly. Depending on the agent
system, individual agents may be represented as independent processes or
lightweight threads. Similarly, the computational environment for an agent
may involve a single host computer or multiple hosts. Our scheme is intended
to work in a variety of agent systems, despite these kinds of implementation
diﬀerences. The approach taken also provides a means to work independently
of or, if available, in conjunction with a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI),
including one built in compliance with the X.509 certiﬁcate standard [2].
We use a simple model of an agent system, which consists of two main
components: the agent and the agent platform, for describing the scheme.
An agent represents the code and state information needed to carry out some
computation. The agent platform provides the computational environment in
which an agent operates. Multiple agents can interact with one another at
an agent platform and use services oﬀered by the platform, such as transport
to another agent platform. The platform where an agent is instantiated and
commences activity is distinguished as the home platform, and is normally
the most trusted environment for an agent. One or more hosts may make up
an agent platform, and an agent platform may support multiple places where
agents can interact. Figure 1 illustrates the agent and agent platform com-
ponents along with other components needed for the privilege management
enhancements described below.
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Fig. 1. Agent System with Enhancements
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2.1 Policy Bearing Certificates
If mobile agents are to operate on behalf of humans, they must follow a pre-
scribed security policy established by principals. Rather than embody policy
rules within an agent, it is possible to push the policy information to an ex-
ternal object — an attribute certiﬁcate. Two variants of attribute certiﬁcates
exist to distinguish those certiﬁcates issued to an agent’s code from those
issued to an instance of an agent (i.e., its code and state information). The
distinction is subtle, but important, since for the latter, the certiﬁcate includes
the values of any instance variables of the agent considered immutable by the
agent system. At a minimum, this must include the globally unique identiﬁer
of the agent, assigned by the agent system.
The issuer of the attribute certiﬁcate adjusts the content in order to govern
the agent’s use of computational resources and security mechanisms. An at-
tribute certiﬁcate must be signed by the issuer to protect the security-relevant
information about the agent from alteration. Elements of an attribute certiﬁ-
cate are pictured in Figure 2. They include the identity of the owner (formed
by a secure hash over the agent’s code and information), the identity of the
issuer, the identiﬁer of the algorithms used to protect the certiﬁcate, the life-
time of the certiﬁcate, and the subject attributes, which may be expressed
as simple type-value pairs or as more complex syntactical expressions. These
elements can be used to establish the validity of the certiﬁcate and the bind-
ing between the attribute certiﬁcate and the agent. Eﬀorts to standardize the
form and content of attribute certiﬁcates are ongoing (see the Related Work
section). Their focus, however, has been mainly on stationary communicat-
ing programs (e.g., client-server systems) or programs having limited mobility
(e.g., applet-like movement from a server to a client) and conveying no state
information or computation data.
Policy certiﬁcates are counterparts to attribute certiﬁcates, but express
policy rules assigned to an agent platform instead of an agent. Policy certiﬁ-
cates follow the same structure of attribute certiﬁcates. While an attribute
certiﬁcate conveys the policy rules associated with an agent, the policy cer-
tiﬁcate conveys policy rules governing the behavior of all agents that may
attempt to visit an agent platform or a speciﬁc place on an agent platform,
and information about the precedence relationships of policy-setting princi-
pals that aﬀect policy processing of ambiguous or contradictory rules. Since
many agent systems take advantage of the security mechanisms provided by
the underlying operating system or virtual machine, maintaining the platform
policy rules separate from the certiﬁcate, in the system access control and au-
thorization ﬁles where they normally reside, can be advantageous. Therefore,
policy certiﬁcates are designed to accommodate such external ﬁle references,
where needed, by including the location of the ﬁle and a cryptographic hash
of the ﬁle’s contents into the policy certiﬁcate, for later access and validation
during certiﬁcate processing.
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Fig. 2. Attribute Certificate Elements
Although the format and structure of the policy certiﬁcate closely follow
that of the attribute certiﬁcate, one signiﬁcant diﬀerence between them is the
binding of the certiﬁcate to the entity issued the certiﬁcate. While an attribute
certiﬁcate has a clear and singular subject — the agent assigned the privileges
— a policy certiﬁcate, in general, may apply to a broader range of subjects
than an individual platform. For example, having a policy certiﬁcate issued by
a domain authority apply to many agent platforms (i.e., those comprising the
domain) would be desirable in some situations, and accomplished through the
choice of an entity name for the owner (e.g., a DNS domain name). Through
conﬁguration parameters set by the platform administrator, the platform ap-
plies the relevant policy certiﬁcates installed there. Policy certiﬁcates may
also reside elsewhere, other than the platform itself, if the location does not
provide an avenue for attack. Policy certiﬁcates are validated by an agent
platform during its initialization and can be applied directly by a platform
then or later, on demand.
2.2 Policy Processing
As an agent moves among agent platforms, it carries along its issued attribute
certiﬁcate(s). It may optionally carry the attribute certiﬁcate(s) and identity
certiﬁcate(s) of the issuer(s) who assigned the privileges to this agent (e.g.,
user or other policy-setting principal) to simplify processing at a platform.
A platform receiving the agent determines the relevancy of the agent’s cer-
tiﬁcate(s), veriﬁes the issuer’s identity, perhaps with the assistance of a PKI,
and determines whether compliance exists between the privilege assignment
conveyed in the attribute certiﬁcates and the platform’s prevailing policy es-
tablished through the policy certiﬁcates it holds. Policy-setting principals can
assign privileges via privilege management certiﬁcates by individually signing
and issuing them to an entity, and having them interpreted and validated by
the policy engine of the agent platform. Joint signing and issuing of certiﬁcates
by multiple policy-setting principals is an option not explored here. Besides
agents and agent platforms, privilege management certiﬁcates, if needed, can
be issued to designated individuals, allowing them to redelegate their assigned
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privileges through certiﬁcate issuance and form veriﬁable authorization chains.
The agent platform, which provides the computational environment of an
agent system, inherently shoulders responsibility for the processing of policy.
This is quite reasonable, given the design goals for an agent system regard-
ing security (e.g., perform the requisite authentication and access control of
other entities). Policy computation is a security-relevant mechanism and in
classical security terms, must be part of the trusted computing base. There-
fore, the policy engine must be implemented as a trusted component of the
agent platform, and its results, the privilege set computed for the agent, must
be enforced by the platform security mechanisms within the computing base.
Most agent systems have a means for extending the agent platform with ad-
ditional program components, for example, in the form of static agents, which
is needed for ﬂexible implementation of the policy engine.
The policy engine’s job is to validate certiﬁcates and any certiﬁcate chains
associated with an agent, process the validated certiﬁcates against the installed
platform policy, and to render a verdict on whether to allow processing by the
agent and under what set of privileges. Validation of certiﬁcate chains can be
a complicated process involving the possibility of expired or revoked certiﬁ-
cates and the necessity to retrieve supporting information. Besides certiﬁcate
validation, the policy engine needs to ascertain the principals involved, their
role in the process (i.e., as an issuer of speciﬁc certiﬁcate types and variants)
and the precedence relationships existing among principals, when rendering a
verdict.
3 Suitability and Use
From the overview, we see that the scheme relies on the placement of pol-
icy rules within certiﬁcates bound to agents and agent platforms, and on the
placement of policy processing capability at an agent platform. This approach
provides suﬃcient ﬂexibility to encompass a very broad range of policies, suit-
able for most agent-based applications. The beneﬁts of this approach are
derived from the kinds of certiﬁcates supported and their form and content,
which were carefully determined.
3.1 Certificate Representation
Privilege management certiﬁcates can be represented in a variety of ways —
typically using the Abstract Syntax Notation 1 (ASN.1) Distinguished Encod-
ing Rules [3]. While an ASN.1 encoding does work suﬃciently, it has a serious
drawback in not being a human readable representation. Moreover, ASN.1
parser tools are neither widely available nor platform independent. Selecting
an eXtended Markup Language (XML) representation [4] for privilege man-
agement certiﬁcates overcomes these limitations. An XML representation can
also be easily tailored to meet the speciﬁc needs of an agent system. Below is
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an example of an XML Data Type Deﬁnition (DTD) for the main structure
of a privilege management certiﬁcate.
Example XML Privilege Management Certificate DTD: 
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='us-ascii'?> 
 
<!ELEMENT privMgtCertificate (version, ownerID, issuerID, 
signatureAlgorithm, serialNumber, 
validityPeriod, attributes,  issuerUniqueID?, extensions?)> 
 
<!ATTLIST privMgtCertificate 
 signature CDATA #REQUIRED> 
 
<!ELEMENT version (#PCDATA)> 
 
<!-- Three ways to identify entity that was issued (owns) this 
certificate --> 
<!ELEMENT ownerID (baseCertificateID | entityName | 
objectDigestInfo)> 
 
<!-- Two ways to identify entity that issued this certificate  --> 
<!ELEMENT issuerID (baseCertificateID | issuerName)> 
 
 <!ELEMENT baseCertificateID (issuer, serial, 
issuerUID?)> 
  <!ELEMENT issuer (#PCDATA)> 
  <!ELEMENT serial (#PCDATA)> 
  <!ELEMENT issuerUID (#PCDATA)> 
 
 <!ELEMENT entityName (#PCDATA)> 
 
<!ATTLIST entityName 
 type CDATA #REQUIRED> 
 
 <!ELEMENT objectDigestInfo (digestAlgorithm, 
objectDigest)> 
  <!ELEMENT digestAlgorithm (#PCDATA)> 
  <!ELEMENT objectDigest (#PCDATA)> 
 
 <!ELEMENT issuerName (#PCDATA)> 
 
<!ELEMENT signatureAlgorithm (#PCDATA)> 
 
<!ELEMENT serialNumber (#PCDATA)> 
 
<!ELEMENT validityPeriod (notBefore, notAfter)> 
 <!ELEMENT notBefore (#PCDATA)> 
 <!ELEMENT notAfter (#PCDATA)> 
 
<!ELEMENT attributes ANY> 
 
<!ATTLIST attributes 
 syntax CDATA #REQUIRED> 
 
<!ELEMENT issuerUniqueID (#PCDATA)> 
 
<!ELEMENT extensions ANY> 
 
<!-- The End --> 
Although the structure of a privilege management certiﬁcate is ﬁxed, por-
tions of it were left open to reﬁnement and substitution. The “attributes”
and the “extensions” elements are intended to convey respectively policy rep-
resented in various types of speciﬁcation languages and certiﬁcate handling
information. The contents of the “attributes” element are determined by a
syntax identiﬁer, making it easy to select among diﬀerent forms of policy rep-
resentation. The “extensions” element by its very nature supports adding
additional elements to a privilege management certiﬁcate to meet the needs
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of an agent system or an application running over it. Convention dictates
that each extension element contains a criticality ﬂag and that the processing
platform, upon encountering a critical extension it does not recognize, rejects
the certiﬁcate.
We can hint at the possible richness of policy expression that might be
conveyed within privilege management certiﬁcates by considering related ef-
forts in distributed system management. Matchmaker [5] uses a complex form
of policy expression to broker between service providers and consumers via a
classiﬁed advertisement (or classads) data model. A classad allows logical
expressions to be used within attributes to qualify the service oﬀered or re-
quired and also supports arithmetic expressions and computations involving
real numbers in determining a match. A more general scheme devised by Koch
et ali. entails the use of a Policy Deﬁnition Language (PDL) to specify exe-
cutable rules suitable for automation of management policy [6]. The PDL sup-
ports logical expressions used as the precondition for triggering management
actions. The IETF’s Security Policy Speciﬁcation Language [7], although spe-
cialized for security and Internet communications, generally follows the PDL
in terms of functionality. Here the management actions involve the form of
protection to be applied to the communications.
3.2 Policy Setting Principals
The types of policy-setting principals supported among existing agent sys-
tems vary in both number and deﬁnition. However, three distinct classes of
policy-setting principals are identiﬁable: branding, using, or hosting classes.
Branding principals are those entities involved in attesting for characteristics
of the agent’s code. A branding principal could be, for example, the manu-
facturer who develops of the code, an evaluator who reviews the code, or an
owner who purchases the code. Using principals represent the individual or
organization on whose behalf the agent operates, and cause the agent to be
launched. Typically, a single using principal exists for each agent, the user
of the agent, but multiple users could be involved in situations where concur-
rence of a second individual is required, such as in some military command
and control operations. Hosting principals are those entities having resource
authorization control over the agent platform. A hosting principal could be,
for example, the system administrator, the system security oﬃcer, the owner
of the platform, or an authorization authority for the domain in which the
platform operates.
Under our scheme, a policy-setting principal is, in eﬀect, any entity that
issues privilege management certiﬁcates. Therefore, the relationship between
policy-setting principals of existing agent systems and those of the scheme
must be established through the types of certiﬁcates a principal can issue.
Speciﬁcally, hosting principals issue policy certiﬁcates, while branding and
using principals issue attribute certiﬁcates, which diﬀer only insofar as those
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issued by the latter convey additional information peculiar to a speciﬁc in-
stance of an agent. Thus, the number and types of policy-setting principals
involved in most agent systems fall into classes of policy-setting principals that
are readily accounted for through certiﬁcate issuance.
3.3 Chained Authorizations
As with identity certiﬁcates, privilege management certiﬁcates may involve
chains of delegation, by which the privileges of an issued certiﬁcate are derived
from those held by the issuer in the form of a privilege management certiﬁcate.
Thus, the scheme can support many diﬀerent styles of privilege authorization
and delegation, from a push-style, where a policy-setting principal ﬁrst gains
privileges from an authorization authority before allocating them to an agent,
to a pull style where the visited platforms contact an authorization authority
to conﬁrm the legitimacy of privileges allocated to an agent by a policy-setting
principal. Agent systems using internal data structures for conveying policy
information typically cannot match the ﬂexibility aﬀorded through privilege
management certiﬁcates and the ability to chain authorizations.
This not meant to imply that privilege management certiﬁcates should
be applied unconditionally. Policy-setting principals should be designated
judiciously and their certiﬁcate issuing applied selectively under the scheme
to minimize policy-processing overhead, yet meet the intended security policy
requirements. For example, not all agents need to carry issued certiﬁcates,
only those needing special privileges for their actions. Similarly, not all three
classes of policy-setting principals need be involved in an application, only
those relevant.
3.4 Criteria
The criteria for applying the scheme to an agent system are threefold:
• Whether the agent’s code is or can be maintained collectively by the agent
system as a bundle throughout the agent’s life cycle.
• Whether the agent platform is amenable to extensions for new services.
• Whether a globally unique identiﬁer is or can be allocated to an instance of
an agent.
The ﬁrst criterion can normally be met either as an existing option of an
agent system or with some adjustment to its implementation. The second is
often available as a feature of most agent systems, since platform enhance-
ments are often useful in the development of agent-based applications. The
last criterion is usually not a problem in most agent systems, since agents are
inherently uniquely identiﬁed entities.
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4 Java-Based Agent Systems
Many agent systems rely on the Java programming language and runtime envi-
ronment for their implementation. While not an agent system itself, Java sup-
ports code mobility, dynamic code downloading, digitally signed code, remote
method invocation, object serialization, platform heterogeneity, and other fea-
tures that make it an ideal foundation for an agent system. Java follows a
so-called sandbox security model, used to isolate memory and method access,
and maintain mutually exclusive execution domains. Java enforces strong
type safety using a variety of mechanisms. Static type checking in the form of
byte code veriﬁcation is used to check the safety of downloaded code. Some
dynamic checking is also performed during runtime. A distinct name space
is maintained for untrusted downloaded code, and linking of references be-
tween modules in diﬀerent name spaces is restricted to public methods. A
security manager mediates all accesses to system resources, serving in eﬀect
as a reference monitor.
A Java language compiler produces byte codes for an abstract computer
called the Java Virtual Machine, which interprets the codes for the host com-
puter on which it executes. More than one Java Virtual Machine (JVM) may
be operating simultaneously on a host computer. Typically, a single JVM is
used to support the execution environment for multiple agents (e.g., Aglets
[8]), each as an independent thread, rather than multiple JVMs (e.g., No-
mads [9]). Dynamic class loading and method invocation features of the JVM
provide a simple, but eﬀective way to support agent platform extensions.
Another feature supported by Java, is the Java Archive (JAR) ﬁle for-
mat, which is based on the de facto, standard ZIP archive format and useful
for managing collections of Java class ﬁles and resources. It is a convenient
way for packaging an agent’s classes for initial distribution and subsequent
movement among visited platforms. The contents of JAR ﬁles may also be
signed for authentication and integrity protection purposes. Thus, many Java-
based mobile agent systems incorporate this format in their design to protect
and simplify management of an agent’s code. A special password-protected
database of private keys and their associated digital certiﬁcates, called the key
store, is supported by Java and its contents used when signing JAR ﬁles. By
default, Java provides a single system-wide policy ﬁle and an optional user
policy ﬁle, as well as a tool for specifying other policies. Figure 3 illustrates a
Java-based mobile agent system and the needed enhancements to enable pro-
cessing of privilege management certiﬁcates. The sections that follow discuss
an implementation of these enhancements in detail.
4.1 Policy Certificates
A policy certiﬁcate is an external XML representation of the policy rules that
pertain to a platform. The platform locates and applies the appropriate policy
certiﬁcates through system properties speciﬁed in the Java security properties
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Fig. 3. Enhancing a Java-based Agent System
ﬁle and the properties ﬁle for the agent system. The information within a
policy certiﬁcate requires parsing and translation into an internal form suitable
for processing by the policy engine.
For any Java-based agent system, the agent platform is a specialized ap-
plication that runs over the JVM. Rather than inventing a solution for policy
speciﬁcation and enforcement, these systems normally rely on the security
policy mechanism aﬀorded by the JVM. Therefore, the issuer of a policy
certiﬁcate encapsulates the according Java policy ﬁles in the certiﬁcate by
reference. Each entry in a Java policy ﬁle indicates the set of permissions
authorized for code from a speciﬁed code source. Policy rules are expressed
using a grant-style policy speciﬁcation language whereby all permissions are
denied unless explicitly assigned to a code source. Permissions represent au-
thorized actions on system objects. The loader uses the assigned permissions
to manage the name space and form a protection domain for any loaded code.
Actions attempted by the code are checked against the domain permissions
via the security manager. Besides standard Java permissions, developers may
also deﬁne permissions speciﬁc to an application.
Java policy is by nature platform-centric. Standard policy rules do not
take into account any policy-setting principals except those associated with
the platform, namely the system administrator and home user, which are of-
ten synonymous. Under the grant-styled policy mechanism of Java, the most
direct means of having external policy rules associated with an agent accepted
and incorporated at a platform is to deﬁne a permission that allows the grant-
ing of those external permissions. Such a privilege-granting permission allows
a platform authority to control the privilege not only with respect to a code
source, but also with respect to a speciﬁc set of policy-setting principals who
issue one or the other variant of an attribute certiﬁcate.
The form of the privilege-granting permission we used begins with its name,
“privilegeAdjustment,” followed by the key store aliases of the permitted cer-
tiﬁcate issuers (may be any, represented by “*”), and completed by either
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of the actions, “sealedBy” for branding principals or “launchedBy” for using
principals. In simple terms, the permission grants an agent’s code source the
right to gain the privileges expressed within an attribute certiﬁcate issued by
some policy-setting principal to either the agent or an instance of the agent.
For example, to permit any agent’s code base, sealed by a trusted reviewer
(i.e., the enterprise security oﬃcer (ESO)) and launched by any trusted user
(i.e., one having an entry in the key store), to adjust its platform privileges
(i.e., be accepted for privilege adjustment processing), the Java policy rule
would be
Grant {Permission privilegeAdjustment “*” “launchedBy”;
Permission privilegeAdjustment “ESO” “sealedBy”;};
In addition to using this new permission in the policy ﬁle, we use the “at-
tributes” element in the policy certiﬁcate to designate which permissions can
be adjusted by what class of policy-setting principal. This constraint mech-
anism keeps privilege adjustment from being completely open and allows for
a limited form of policy stratiﬁcation. For example, users may be limited
to controlling features of the agent system, while manufacturers may be lim-
ited to certain virtual machine resources. Similarly, the precedence among
policy-setting principals and the minimal and maximal occurrences of their
certiﬁcates are conveyed in the “extensions” element, along with pertinent
certiﬁcate delegation information and an optional policy identiﬁer. This in-
formation allows the policy engine to determine whether an agent has suﬃcient
certiﬁcates to begin processing and the order in which to apply the rules.
Thus, the standard Java policy mechanism can be extended in a manner
suitable for meeting the security policy requirements of most agent systems.
Implementing the scheme as described, does not aﬀect the syntax or structure
of Java policy ﬁles, which remain the primary means for expressing platform
policy. Instead of replacing policy ﬁles, policy certiﬁcates incorporate their
contents through reference. This approach allows policy certiﬁcates to be
issued to any standard Java policy ﬁle by a policy-setting principal in the same
manner as attribute certiﬁcates are issued to an agent — via a cryptographic
hash of the contents of the policy ﬁle.
4.2 Attribute Certificates
An attribute certiﬁcate is an external XML representation of the policy rules
that pertain to an agent. The responsibility for maintaining relevant attribute
certiﬁcates with an agent as it moves among platforms falls to the agent sys-
tem. Java-based mobile agent system usually allows movement of mobile code
as either individual class ﬁles or a JAR ﬁle. Because JAR ﬁles are the pre-
scribed means within the Java framework for signing and verifying code, most
security-conscious designers incorporate them into the agent system. In addi-
tion to the archived code, a signed JAR ﬁle contains a pair of ﬁles, a signature
instruction and a digital signature ﬁle, for each signer of one or more of the
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ﬁles contained in the archive. These ﬁles are maintained in a special direc-
tory — the META-INF directory. Additional meta-information, such as the
identity certiﬁcates of the entity that signed the code, may also be included
within the META-INF directory to simplify the veriﬁcation processing of the
JAR contents by a recipient.
Because of its ﬂexibility for conveying meta-information, an agent’s JAR
ﬁle also makes a suitable container for attribute certiﬁcates issued to the agent.
Once the agent’s code resides within the JAR, it can be cryptographically
bound to a certiﬁcate, and the certiﬁcate placed within the META-INF di-
rectory for subsequent use. Multiple certiﬁcates can be accommodated to
support policies involving multiple policy-setting principals. Not confusing
the standard Java security features regarding signed JAR ﬁles with those of
attribute certiﬁcates is important. In principle, they are distinct and can be
applied either individually or jointly. The described JAR extensions follow
this principle. However, some redundancy exists in situations where a brand-
ing principal issues an attribute certiﬁcate for an agent in addition to signing
its JAR, since the certiﬁcate’s message digest over the agent’s code aﬀords
similar protection. One advantage of using attribute certiﬁcates is that their
expiration date can be set much shorter than the validity period of the signing
key, eﬀectively enabling the lifetime of the authorization to be limited to an
appropriate period.
As with the policy certiﬁcate, other useful information, such as an optional
policy identiﬁer to distinguish one set of assigned policy rules from another,
can appear in the “extensions” portion of an attribute certiﬁcate. They include
a constraint indicator to determine whether the entity issued the certiﬁcate
is a terminal policy-setting principal or an intermediate one able to reassign
privileges for a designated number of decedents, and a renewal service location
to determine where an expiring attribute certiﬁcate can be extended and for
what duration and number of times. In the case where an attribute certiﬁcate
is issued to an instance of an agent, the “extensions” portion of the attribute
certiﬁcate is used to convey values of immutable instance variables and, thus,
protect them from tampering via the certiﬁcate’s signature. Recall that the
globally unique identiﬁer of an agent must be treated this way.
4.3 Policy Engine
Besides verifying the prevailing policy certiﬁcates and the binding to their as-
sociated policy ﬁle, the agent platform must be extended to invoke attribute
certiﬁcate processing for an agent when it arrives. The policy engine is a
new object class whose job is to perform the needed computations and deter-
mine the allowable privileges for the agent’s code. The privileges consist of an
authorized set of Java permissions, representing the amalgamation of policy
rules within the attribute and policy certiﬁcates. Null privileges imply that
no processing is permitted (i.e., no permissions granted). Typically, the pol-
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icy engine can be located and instantiated by the agent platform as a trusted
component at initialization time through the properties ﬁle of the agent sys-
tem. Since the policy engine is a Java object class, its instantiation is trivial.
It would, therefore, be possible to support more than one policy engine at a
platform, if support for multiple places or application contexts were needed.
The policy engine supports a single method, called to verify the relevant
attribute certiﬁcates and return the allowable set of privileges. Since the stan-
dard Java policy mechanisms remain intact, the policy engine can utilize them
in its processing, which simpliﬁes the implementation of the policy engine. For
example, when the policy engine needs to determine the baseline permissions
assigned to a particular protection domain, it can use the standard Java Ap-
plication Programming Interface (API) to ask the currently installed Java
policy object for that information. Similarly, through an existing API, it can
determine whether a permission asserted in an attribute certiﬁcate is implied
by those baseline permissions. For a grant-style policy mechanism, the pol-
icy engine computation essentially becomes the logical union of the baseline
permissions with any permissions conveyed in the attribute certiﬁcates, sub-
ject to the precedence of policy-setting principals who issued the certiﬁcates
and any privilege adjustment constraints imposed by the prevailing platform
policy. While the policy engine determines allowable privileges, it does not
enforce them. Enforcement is the responsibility of the agent platform program
component responsible for code migration and other administrative functions.
This component must be augmented to restrain the agent’s code by asserting
the associated security permissions within a protection domain using features
of the Java security class loader.
5 Related Work
Work is progressing within standardization bodies [10,11] to compliment the
X.509 identity-based certiﬁcate standards with standards for privilege man-
agement. The framework for privilege management generally follows X.509
principles by which a trusted party, called an authorization authority, issues
attribute certiﬁcates to human or machine entities that may in turn delegate
that authorization. In addition to the issuing and delegation of privileges via
attribute certiﬁcates, their revocation is also addressed within the framework.
The framework includes deﬁnition of the information objects needed for a
privilege management infrastructure, including attribute certiﬁcates, privilege
policy format and attribute certiﬁcate revocation list. Work is also being done
within the IETF [12] to establish an interoperability proﬁle of these standards,
intended for generic applications, such as electronic mail, which have limited
special-purpose requirements.
The Anchor Toolkit is a mobile agent system that provides for the secure
transmission and management of mobile agents [13]. The toolkit protects the
agents being dispatched between hosts through encrypted channels. A mobile
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agent’s host platform is required to sign the agent’s persistent state before
dispatching the agent to the next platform. The signed persistent state can
be used later to detect potential problems with the agent’s state. The toolkit
uses another security tool, called Akenti, developed by the authors to provide
access control to the resources of a mobile agent’s host platform. Akenti uses
public/private key signed certiﬁcates to express user identity, resource use-
conditions, and user attributes. Use-conditions are used to express platform
policy, while user attributes typically represent a single privilege granted to
the mobile code by some authority. Akenti makes access control decisions for
each trusted agent and allows execution only after it authenticates the agents,
the server that dispatched the agent, and all the hosts the agent visited in
attaining its current state. This scheme relies on a level of trust between
mobile agent platforms to make access control decisions in order to mitigate
the risk associated with accepting mobile agents.
SESAME is a multi-domain distributed-system security architecture built
around the use of authentication and privilege certiﬁcates [14]. Both users and
applications are controlled in the same way when accessing protected resources
- they must ﬁrst obtain proof of their privileges in the form of a Privilege At-
tribute Certiﬁcate (PAC) and then present it to a target application when
requesting resource access. The target application may in turn access another
target using the delegated privileges. Access control information is represented
generically to facilitate mapping to the diﬀerent types of access controls on
targeted resources. SESAME follows a delegation-only model for authoriza-
tion. PAC revocation is avoided by relying on short delegation periods. While
the focus of SESAME is solely on static client-server type applications, it
provides a good example of the underlying framework needed when applying
certiﬁcate-based solutions for distributed-system security.
Nikander and Partanen [15] describe a method for enhancing the Java
language environment with policy expression and processing via Simple Pub-
lic Key Infrastructure (SPKI) certiﬁcates. SPKI certiﬁcates are a proposed
alternative to using X.509 certiﬁcates, emphasizing key, rather than individ-
ual, identities. The motivation for the enhancement was to make it possible
to distribute Java security policy management fully in a way that does not
aﬀect the local conﬁguration. They accomplished this by assigning permis-
sions to class ﬁles bundled within a JAR ﬁle, using SPKI certiﬁcates in a
manner similar to our use of attribute certiﬁcates. No counterpart to policy
certiﬁcates appears in their method, however. The approach essentially goes
from one extreme (i.e., platform-centric policy speciﬁcation) to another (i.e.,
a code-centric policy speciﬁcation), and relies completely on the contents of
validated certiﬁcate chains for determining the permissions for a protection
domain of a given class. As with SESAME, the focus here is on client-server
type applications. However, because of the method’s ﬂexibility and grounding
in Java, it could be extended for use in Java-based agent systems. State Ap-
praisal deﬁnes a security mechanism for protection of mobile agents. The goal
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of State Appraisal is to ensure that an agent has not been somehow subverted
due to alterations of its state information [16]. Both the author and owner
of an agent produce appraisal functions that become part of an agent’s code.
Appraisal functions are used to determine what privileges to grant an agent,
based both on conditional factors and whether the identiﬁed state invariants
hold. An agent whose state violates an invariant can be granted no privi-
leges, while an agent whose state fails to meet some conditional factors may
be granted a restricted set of privileges. When the author and owner each
digitally sign an agent, their respective appraisal functions are protected from
undetectable modiﬁcation. One way of looking at this in comparison with
attribute certiﬁcates is that state appraisal conveys both the policy engine
and the prescribed policy internal to the agent. An agent platform uses the
functions to verify the correct state of an incoming agent and to determine
what privileges the agent can possess during execution. Privileges are issued
by a platform based on the results of the appraisal function and the platform’s
security policy.
6 Summary
Attribute certiﬁcates are a ﬂexible way to express the privileges associated
with a mobile agent, in accordance with the principle of least privilege. At-
tribute certiﬁcates also provide a natural alternative to using internal data
structures commonly found in most agent systems. When combined with pol-
icy certiﬁcates and the ability for most agents systems to extend the agent
platform with a policy engine, they provide a useful framework that is tai-
lorable to meet the security policy of an application. The degree of tailorability
includes the ability to deﬁne various policy-setting principals, precedence re-
lationships among those principals, application speciﬁc attributes, and policy
processing algorithms.
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